A clandestine cell system is a method for
organizing a group of people such as
resistance fighters, sleeper agents, or
terrorists so that such people can more
effectively resist penetration by an
opposing organization.
In a cell structure, each of the small group
of people in the cell only know the
identities of the people in their cell. Thus, a
cell member who is apprehended and
interrogated (or who is a mole) will not
likely know the identities of the higher-
ranking individuals in the organization.
The structure of a clandestine cell system
can range from a strict hierarchy to an
extremely distributed organization,
depending on the group's ideology, its
operational area, the communications
technologies available, and the nature of
the mission.
This sort of organizational structure is
also used by criminal organizations,
undercover operations, and
unconventional warfare units led by
special forces.
Covert Operations vs.Clandestine Operations:-
Covert and clandestine operations are not
the same when it comes to tradecraft. The
modern NATO definition of a covert
operation says the identity of the sponsor
is concealed, but in a clandestine
operation the operation itself is concealed
from the participants. Put differently,clandestine means "hidden", and covert
means "deniable" — that is to say that the
sponsor of a covert action is sufficiently
removed from it that the sponsor can
claim ignorance in the event the plot is
discovered.A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolatedgrouping of sleeper agents, that lies
dormant until it receives orders or decides
to act.
History:-
In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams
parachuted into occupied France to lead
unconventional warfare units.They
were composed of two officers — one
American or British, and the other French,
the latter preferably from the area into
which they landed — and a third member
who was a radio operator.
Especially through the French member,
they would contact trusted individuals in
the area of operation, and ask them to
recruit a team of trusted subordinates (a
subcell). If the mission was sabotage,
reconnaissance, or espionage, there was
no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out direct action it would be necessary to assemble into larger units for combat. Even then
the hideouts of the leadership known only to the subshell leaders.
Also known as the Viet Cong, this
organization grew from earlier anticolonial
groups fighting the French and from anti-
Japanese guerrillas during World War II.
Its command, control, and communication
techniques derived from the experiences
of these earlier insurgent groups. The
group had extensive support from North
Vietnam, and, indirectly, from the Soviet.
Union. It had parallel political and military
structures, often overlapping. See Viet
Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.
The lowest level consisted of three-
person cells who operated quite closely,
and engaged in the sort of self-criticism
common, as a bonding method, to
Communist organizations.
Provisional Irish Republican
Army The modern Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) has a history going back to
Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th
century. It has little external control. Its
doctrine and organization have changed
over time, as political, technological, and
cultural situations have changed in
Ireland. Officially, the PIRA was hierarchical, but asBritish security forces became more
effective it changed to a semiautonomous
model for its operational and for certain of
its support cells (such as transportation,
intelligence, cover, and security).Its
leadership saw itself as guiding and as
building consensus. The lowest-level cells,
typically of 2–5 people, tended to be built
from people with existing personal relationships. British counterinsurgents
could understand the command structure,
but not the workings of the operational
cells.The IRA had an extensive network of
inactive or sleeper cells, so it could
summon new ad hoc organizations for any
specific operation.
External support:-
Many cell systems receive support from
outside the cell. This can include leaders,
trainers, and supplies (such as the
Jedburgh assistance to the French
Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (such as the NLF spokesmen
who could operate in Hanoi).
External support need not be overt. Certain
Shi'a groups in Iraq, for example, receive
assistance from Iran, but this is not a
public position of the government of Iran,
and may even be limited to factions of that
government. Early U.S. support to the
Afghan Northern Alliance against the
Taliban used clandestine operators from
the CIA and United States Army Special
Forces. As the latter conflict escalated,
U.S. participation became overt. Note that both unconventional warfare
(guerrilla operations) and foreign internal
defense (counterinsurgency) may be
covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert counterinsurgency mission,
only selected host nation leaders are
aware of the foreign support organization.
Under Operation White Star, for example,
U.S. personnel gave covert
counterinsurgency assistance to the Royal
Lao Army starting in 1959, this became
overt in 1961, and finally ceased
operations in 1962.
Infrastructure cells:-
Any clandestine or covert service,
especially a non-national one, needs a
variety of technical and administrative
functions, such as:[14]
1. Forged documents and counterfeit
currency
2. Apartments and hiding places
3. Communication means
4. Transportation means
5. Information
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Transport
8. Psychological operations
9. Training
10. Finance
A national intelligence service[15] has a
support organization to deal with services
like finance, logistics, facilities (e.g.,
safehouses), information technology,
communications, training, weapons and
explosives, medical services, etc.
Transportation alone is a huge function,
including the need to buy tickets without
drawing suspicion, and, where appropriate,
using private vehicles. Finance includes the need to transfer money without
coming under the suspicion of financial
security organizations.
Some of these functions, such as finance,
are far harder to operate in remote areas
(like the FATA of Pakistan) than in cities
with large numbers of official and
unofficial financial institutions and the
communications to support them. If the
financial office is distant from the remote
headquarters, there is a need for couriers,
who must be trusted to some extent, but
who may not know the contents of their
messages or the actual identity of sender
and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance among type and size of
message, security, and technology
available, may memorize messages, carry
audio or video recordings, or hand-carry
computer media.
Operational cells:-
For each mission, one or more operational
cells are created. If al-Qaeda uses its
typical modus operandi of multiple
concurrent attacks, there may be an
operational cell for each target location.
Some operations may need support cells
in the operational area. For example, it
may be more secure to have a local cell
build bombs, which will be delivered by
cells coming from outside the area.
"Operational cells are not created, but
instead 'seeded' utilizing individuals
spotted or that request assistance (both
groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the observation of the core group, which
dramatically restricts the opportunity for
passing off walk-ins under false flag).
Categorization of operational cells
appears to be by capabilities, region, and
then task/operation. Operational cells are
composed of members whose worldview
has been firmly tested—necessary to front-
load, because such cells are dispersed
back to their own local control (or negative
control—proscribed behavior—with
positive control only coming in the form of
contact for synchronization or
support)."
If operational cells routinely are "released"
curved dotted lines on link to military cells
to select their final operational parameters,
they use a different paradigm than
governmental clandestine or covert
operations. U.S. special operations forces
sometimes wait for Presidential
authorization to make an attack, or even to
move to staging areas. A country would
have to face the consequences of an
inappropriate attack, so it may tend to be
overcautious, whereas a terror network
might merely shrug at the world being
upset. Assuming that the al-Qaeda
operational technique is not to use
positive control, their operations may be more random, but also more
unpredictable for counterterror forces. If
their cells need constant control, there are
communications links that might be
detected by SIGINT, and if their command
can be disrupted, the field units could not
function. Since there is fairly little
downside for terrorists to attack out of
synchronization with other activities, the
lack of positive control becomes a
strength of their approach to cell
organization.
Operational cells need to have continuous
internal communication; there is a
commander, who may be in touch with
infrastructure cells or, less likely from a
security standpoint, with the core group.
Al-Qaeda's approach differs from that of
earlier terrorist organizations:
Cells are redundant and distributed,
making them difficult to ‘roll up’
Cells are coordinated, not under
"command & control"—this autonomy and local control makes them flexible,
and enhances security
Trust and comcon internally to the cell
provide redundancy of potential
command (a failure of Palestinian
operations in the past), and well as a
shared knowledge base (which may
mean, over time, that ‘cross training’
emerges inside a cell, providing
redundancy of most critical skills and
knowledge).
Indirect support networks:-
In the above graphic, note the indirect
support network controlled by Richard's
subcell. "While Al-Qaida has elements of the
organization designed to support the
structure, but such elements are
insufficient in meeting the needs of such
an organization, and for security reasons
there would be redundant and
secondary-/tertiary-networks that are
unaware of their connection to Al-Qaida.
These networks, primarily related to
fundraising and financial activities, as well
as technology providers, are in a ‘use’
relationship with Al-Qaida—managed
through cut-outs or individuals that do not
inform them of the nature of activities, and
that may have a cover pretext sufficient to
deflect questions or inquiry.
A possible countermeasure:-
In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said
that American intelligence was beginning
to acquire intelligence on al-Qaida
indicating that "[o]nce thought nearly
impossible to penetrate, al-Qaeda is
proving no tougher a target than the KGB
or the Mafia—closed societies that took
the U.S. government years to get inside.
'We're getting names, the different camps
they trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting,'
says an intelligence official. 'It's very
promising.'"The report also said that
the collected data has allowed the
recruiting of informants.
Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military
Review, David W. Pendall suggested that a
"catch-and-release program for suspected
operatives might create reluctance or
distrust in such suspects and prevent
them from further acts or, perhaps more
important, create distrust in the cell
leaders of these individuals in the future."
The author noted the press release
describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's
cooperation with the United States is "sure
to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a
trusted member and most likely limits the
further trust and assignments of close cell
associates still at large. The captor would
determine when to name names and when to remain silent." Indeed, once
intelligence learns the name and
characteristics of an at-large adversary, as
well as some sensitive information that
would plausibly be known to him, a news
release could be issued to talk about his
cooperation. Such a method could not be
used too often, but, used carefully, could
disturb the critical trust networks. The
greatest uncertainty might be associated
with throwing doubt onto a key member of
an operational cell that has gone
autonomous.
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